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STATE OF UTAH 
THE AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, 
a Maryland corporation, 
Pwintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GENERAL CONTRACTING CORP., 
a Utah corporation; FEDERAL 
INSURANCE CO., a corporation; and 
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPO-
RATION, a New Jersey corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 10326 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants' (respondents' ) Brief under Point I raised 
an issue which was not discussed in plaintiff's (appellant's) 
brief. In order to properly discuss and argue this issue, 
it is necessary that certain facts concerning the handling 
of the case in the trial court be set forth. The parties are 
referred to herein by the same designations as used in 
Appellant's Brief. This case was argued on two occasions 
in the district court. 
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On October 20, 1964, the case was argued before 
District Judge Marcellus K. Snow on defendants' motion to 
dismiss. Arguments by each side were b1ief but in its 
argument opposing the motion, plaintiff, now appellant, 
argued two main points, first its claim on the bond required 
by the Contractors' Bonding Statute, and second its claim 
based on common law contract principles, specifically that 
plaintiff was a third party beneficiary under the construc-
tion contract between defendant, U. S. Steel and the State 
of Utah. The court denied the motion to dismiss. 
On January 20, 1965 at a special setting before Judge 
Stewart M. Hanson on cross motions for summary judgment, 
the case was argued at length. On that occasion, counsel 
for plaintiff devoted about half his argument to the com-
mon law contract claim (third party beneficiary) and cited 
cases and authorities in support thereof, including Smith 
vs. Bowman, 32 Utah 33-39, 88 P 687 and State vs. Camp-
bell Building Co., (Utah 1938) 77 P 2d 341. Defendants' 
counsel responded to this argument arguing among other 
things that the bonding statute was plaintiff's exclusive 
remedy. On both occasions, defendants were represented 
by the same counsel who prepared Respondents' Brief. 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S COMMON LAW CONTRACT 
CLAIM, THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A THIRD 
PARTY BENEFICIARY UNDER THE CON-
STRUCTION CONTRACT, WAS CONTAINED 
IN THE PLEADINGS AND WAS RAISED IN 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
Point I in defendants' (respondents') brief raises a 






lt is asserted in the title of said Point I that "The Third 
Party Beneficiary Theory ... Was Neither Raised Nor 
Preserved In The Record On Appeal. ... " 
Plaintiff's Complaint, R. 1, 2 and 3, contains allega-
tions of facts sufficient to constitute a claim in common 
law contract. Furthermore, as set forth in the Supplemen-
tal Statement of Facts, on two occasions in the trial comt, 
the issues of the case were argued and on each occasion, 
defendants' counsel being present, plaintiff argued the com-
mon law contract claim and theorv. , 
An anlysis of the complaint reveals that it alleges 
facts sufficient to state both claims, the one on the bond 
and bond statute and the other on the contract. The Com-
plaint contains the following essential allegations of fact: 
That the defendant, contractor, U. S. Steel, entered into 
a contract with the State Road Commission of Utah whereby 
U. S. Steel agreed to furnish the labor, equipment and 
materials necessary to perform work in the construction 
of one steel arch bridge; (a copy of the contract is attached 
to the Complaint, marked EXHIBIT "A" and by reference 
made a part thereof); that the Subcontractor was a sub-
contractor of U. S. Steel, and, in the prosecution of the 
work required under the contract ordered and received 
materials from plaintiff which were used in the prosecution 
of the work; and that said materials were of a certain value 
and payment had not been received therefor. (A copy of 
the bond, EXHIBIT "B" was also attached to the Com-
plaint and made a part thereof. ) Then follows paragraph 9 
of the Complaint which alleges: "Pursuant to EXHIBITS 
"A" and "B," the defendants Contractor and Surety also 
owe plaintiff $3,773.00." (Emphasis added) Nowhere in 
the Complaint is it alleged that the only claim or cause 
of action is on the bond. The Complaint alleges more than 
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would be necessary if the only claim intended had been 
on the bond. If the claim on the bond was all that had 
been intended, paragraph 9 of the Complaint would be 
surplusage. The inclusion of the term "also" in paragraph 9 
is noted, indicating that in addition to other claims plaintiff 
also asserted its claim under the contract. 
Defendants point out in their brief that plaintiff filed 
no memorandum in the trial court. This is bue but the 
filing of a written argument or memorandum is not a pre· 
requisite to the preservation of a claim or theory on appeal. 
Plaintiff's common law contract claim was adequately set 
forth in the Complaint. 
Defendants assert that plaintiff's Complaint contains 
only one count. The Complaint, R. 1, 2, and 3, contains 
12 paragraphs and a prayer. It is not subdivided by counts. 
The rules do not require that separate causes of action 
be stated in separate counts. 
The party may set forth two or more statements of 
a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, 
either in one count or defense or in separate counts 
or defenses. 
Rule 8 ( e) ( 2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
One of the prime purposes of modem code pleading, 
specifically the new rules as adopted in Utah, was to sim· 
plify the technical requirements of pleadings; to provide 
that facts rather than law be plead. It is not essential 
that a pleader specify the theories. 
Judge Charles E. Clark speaking on this point has said. 
If the plaintiff is to be expected to state only the 
past occurrences between the parties, and the court 
is then to grant him such relief as those occurrenc~s 
justify, it should be immaterial that he called his 
4 
action one of tort, whereas the court thought it was 
one of contract, or one in "equity," whereas the court 
thought it one "at law." This has been ruled many 
times by able courts .... Therefore, he should not be 
forced to fulfill any requirement of having and main-
taining a single legal theory of his pleadings; he 
should be held only to the ideal of reasonably fair 
notice of the facts of his case. 
Clark on Code Pleading, 
Second Edition, p. 261. 
Defendants' main theme seems to be that plaintiff failed 
to raise its "contract theory" in the lower court and preserve 
it in the record. Under the rules it is not the theory that 
must be plead but rather facts sufficient to state a claim. 
The rule on this point is well stated in one of the texts. 
Under modern practice, where the test of sufficiency 
of plaintiff's initial pleading is whether, if the facts 
therein alleged are admited or proved, he is entitled 
to recover against defendant . . . and under which 
practice if plaintiff is entitled to some relief under 
the facts which he has set forth he will be granted 
such relief, although it differs from the relief for 
which he prayed . . . it has been considered that 
plaintiff is not obligated to forecast with absolute 
accuracy the theory of either the law or the facts 
on which he will relv at the trial, and that while 
good practice calls f ~r a definite theory, the mere 
absence of such a theory is not of itself fatal to a 
complaint. 
The statement continues: 
Moreover, the fact that the complaint is drawn on an 
erroneous theory will not prove fatal where it alleges 
facts sufficient to support the judgment. Accordingly, 
it is frequently held that, if the complaint states a 
cause of action on any theory, it is sufficient, that the 
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facts alleged need not be such as to entitle plaintiff 
to recover under any particular form of action, and 
that the petition need not be invulnerable as against 
a motion to make more definite and certain. 
The statement then concludes: 
If a complaint sets up two theories of recovery, and 
the major theory fails, plaintiff may avail himself of 
the minor theory if this works no injustice to his op-
ponent, and, if a plaintiff adopts a wrong theory and 
fails to prove the cause of action intended, where he 
proves any other cause of action embraced by the 
allegations in his pleading, he may recover on that. 
71 C.J.S. 228, 229, Pleading, 
Section 92. To the same effect see also 
41 Am. Jur. 347, Pleading, Section 81. 
The intent of the drafters of the new rules that they 
should serve the ends of justice and not deny justice by 
technicalities is particularly indicated in certain of the 
rules. Rule 54 ( c) ( 1 ) provides: 
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is 
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not de-
manded such relief in his pleadings. 
See also "Some of the Purposes and Effects of the New 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure," 2 Utah Law Review 21. 
In a recent Utah case decided by this Court where the 
court considered generally the question of pleading a proper 
theory, it said: 
"Sec. 104-1-2, U.C.R. 1943 provides: 
There is in this state but one fom1 of civil action 
for the enforcement or protection of private right:, 
and the redress or prevention of private wrongs. 
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Under this section this court has held that a pleader 
is not required to follow any particular form or 
special theory in stating tl1e facts, and if the facts 
stated entitled plaintiff to any relief under the sub-
stantive law, then he has stated what is termed "a 
good cause of action," and the court must enter judg-
ment in his favor so far as any attack upon the suffi-
ciency of the pleading is concerned. 
Hanson vs. Openshaw, (Utah 1945) 
155 P. 2d 410. 
In a suit between partners to establish a partnership 
and to recover for partnership property allegedly diverted 
by defendants, this court had under consideration the suffi-
ciency of an amended complaint and the question arose 
as to whether the complaint embraced two causes of action, 
one to declare the existence of a partnership and for an 
accounting and the other sounding in fraud, the court noted: 
It is not necessary to designate the type of action. 
The code only requires a statement of the facts con-
stituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise 
language. 
Further on in the decision the Court continues: 
It is not required that a series of transactions so 
closely related in time and fact as to produce a 
substantial cause and effect transition be grouped 
and compartmentalized so as to fall into designated 
types of legal actions. The law serves life. Reformed 
pleading unlike that of common law is not a straight 
jacket which allows no freedom of movement. Life 
and the books are replete with cases where the al-
leged wrong emanates or evolves from a series of 
related transactions in which various actors have 
played varying parts with varying degrees of guilt 
or delict. The wrong chosen from the whole of the 
facts as a basis for the action is nonetheless so be-
cause a separation and grouping of some of the 
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transactions along the way may disclose other lesser 
or incidental wrongs which could themselves have 
been made the basis of causes of action of a con-
ventional type. 
Graham vs. Street (Utah 1946) 
166 P. 2d 524 
See also California Land & Con-
struction Co. vs. Halloran 
(Utah 1932) 17 P. 2d 209 
Defendants rely heavily on Dix Lumber Company vs. 
City of Boston, 289 Mass. 291, 194 N.E. 117, asserting that 
the precise question now before this court was before the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in that case. 
We submit that the precise question before the court now 
was not considered by the Massachusetts court in that 
case. The holding there differs in several respects. The 
primary question was whether materials furnished by the 
Plaintiff on a public construction project had been "used 
or employed" as those terms were used in the statute. The 
decision was that since none of the materials were incor-
porated in the finished structures or were entirely destroyed 
in prosecuting the work, the materialmen could not recover. 
That case differs from this case in the following respects: 
( 1) There a new argument was raised for the first 
time in oral argument before the appellate court. Here, 
all arguments now being made were made before the trial 
court. ( 2) There, the Appellants contended that even 
though they could not recover under the terms of the statu-
tory bond, they should be entitled to recover on a common 
law bond theory. Here, plaintiff is not contending to re· 
cover on a common law bond theory as to the surety; rather 
it is contending to recover under the contract of the general 
contractor on a common law contract theory. (3) There, 
Appellant had sought recovery solely on the bond. Here, 
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plaintiff seeks recovery on one claim on the bond and on 
the second claim on the contract. 
The case of Pettingill r:s. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 
P 2d 185 cited and quoted from by Defendants is foreign 
both to the issues and circumstances of this case. In that 
case, a suit by a father against a motorist for injuries to 
his son, the trial court at the Plaintiff's request gave instruc-
tions covering the contributory negligence of the mother. 
On appeal, the Plaintiff argued that the negligence of the 
mother, if any, was immaterial. The main point of the 
decision is contained in the following statement in the 
decision immediately preceding the statement quoted on 
page 8 of Respondent's Brief: 
Furthermore, it is well established that a party can-
not assign as error the giving of his own requests. 
He cannot lead the court into error and then be 
heard to complaint thereof. 
The rule cited in Defendants' Brief from the North 
Salt Lake vs. St. Joseph Water and Irr. Co. case, 118 Utah 
600, 223 P 2d 577, is not applicable because here, unlike 
the circumstance there, the issues were initially raised in 
the court below. 
Defendants argue that plaintiff has shifted its theory 
on appeal. Plaintiff's claims, causes of action, theories, etc., 
have always been present in the case, as set forth in the 
facts alleged in the Complaint and such claims or theories 
were argued with Defendants on two occasions in the trial 
court. Even if there were merit to Defendants' argument, 
as the foregoing authorities conclude, a party may rely on 
whatever theory or claim may be supported by the facts 
alleged in the Complaint. 
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POINT II 
THE CONTRACTORS' BOND STATUTE IS 
NOT EXCLUSIVE AND HAS NO RESTRICTIVE 
EFFECT AS TO A CLAIM BY A MATERIAL-
MAN AGAINST A CONTRACTOR ON THE 
LATTER'S CONTRACT. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that the bond here involved 
was furnished pursuant to the requirements of the Con-
tractors' Bond Statute, Chapter 1 of Title 14, (either the 
old statute, Sections 14-1-1 through 14-1-4, or the new stat-
ute, Sections 14-1-5 through 14-1-9). Plaintiff further ac-
knowledges that the requirements of the statute are applic-
able as to claims on the bond. However, under the cir-
cumstances of this case, plaintiff has, and has asserted two 
claims, one on the bond and the other on the contract; 
the latter to pursue its rights as a third party beneficiary 
under such contract. 
A prime purpose of the Utah Contractors' Bond Stat-
ute, Chapter 1, Title 14 was to protect materialmen in cir-
cumstances where the contractor and subcontractor became 
defunct or insolvent. C'.lmpbell Building Co. vs. District 
Court of Millard County, 90 Utah 552, 63 P 2d 255. The 
statute required the furnishing of a bond and provided 
that if the bond were not furnished the materialman could 
bring an action against the public body. The statute con-
tained a statute of limitations and certain procedural re-
quirements which plaintiff acknowledges must be recognized 
in pursuing a claim on the bond. Defendants, however, 
appear to ignore the right that a materialman has to pro-
ceed against the contractor independently of the bond. 
Although the enactment of the Contractors' Bond Statute, 
Chapter 1 of Title 14, afforded a materialman additional 
protection by making available to him the payment bond, 
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the statute was not intended to deprive the materialman of 
ordinary contract rights that he might otherwise have against 
the contractor. 
The enactment of the Contractors' Bond Statute, af-
forded the materialman an extra remedy - an action on the 
bond against the surety and contractor. Without the statute 
a materialsman normally had a contract action against the 
contractors for supplying and furnishing labor and materials. 
The Contractors' Bond Statute did not destroy this right 
of action. The statute requires the bond - it does not re-
quire the contract. The bond exists apart from the contract 
and the contract apart from the bond and although one 
may refer to the other; different rights and obligations are 
created by each. See Nash Engineering Co. v. Marcy Realty 
Corporation, (Ind. 1944) 54 N.E. 2d 263. In suits on the 
bond, the limitations and requirements stated in the statute 
are applicable. Such statutory limitations and requirements 
have no application with respect to suits against the con-
tractor on the contract. 
The essential circumstances of this case which are 
relevant to thi~ Point are as follows: The contractor, re-
spondent, U. S. Steel, entered into a written contract with 
the State of Utah agreeing to construct a steel bridge and 
furnish all materials and supplies therefor. (The bonding 
statute did not require this contract.) By the terms of this 
contract, certain other documents including the bond were 
specifically made a part of the contract. One provision of 
the bond provides that the contractor shall pay all material-
men, including materialmen of subcontractors. U. S. Steel 
engaged the subcontractor to perform certain work on the 
bridge and at the subcontractor's request plaintiff furnished 
materials which were used on the project. Under the clear 
language of the contract and on ordinary principles of 
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contract law plaintiff was a third party beneficiary entitled 
to recover from U. S. Steel for the value of the materials 
supplied. 
Defendants fail to distinguish between plaintiff's claim 
against the contractor on the contract and plaintiff's claim 
against the surety and the contractor on the bond. As 
heretofore stated, the contract between U. S. Steel and the 
State of Utah was not required by the bonding statute and 
rights and obligations which arose out of this contract must 
be determined by looking to the provisions of the contract 
itself and principles of contract law. The requirements of 
the statute in no way affect the rights and obligations 
created under the contract. 
It is significant to note that although plaintiff, in pur· 
suing its contract claim, relies on certain language in the 
bond, such language is relied on only as it constitutes a 
part of the contract. As heretofore stated, the contract 
expressly provided that the bond become a part of the 
conract. The bond itself is not relied on as an instrument 
creating liability. It is the contract which creates in plain· 
tiff its rights as a third party beneficiary and certain pro-
visions of the bond are applicable as they constitute a part 
of the contract. 
Plaintiff has no serious dispute with the cases cited 
by Defendants under Point II of their Brief. The essential 
holding in those cases is that where a materialman files 
suit on a bond given pursuant to the requirements of a 
statute the bond must be construed together with the 
statute, and the remedies afforded by the statute are ex· 
elusive, so far as a cwim on the bond is concerned. (Em· 
phasis added) But those cases are not applicable. Here 
we are considering plaintiff's claim on the contract. Those 
cases do not hold that the bonding statutes restrict or 
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preclude contract actions by materialmen against the con-
tractor based on the construction contract. 
On page 14 of their Brief, Defendants cite and rely 
upon General Electric Supp. Corp. v. Willey Electric Co., 
47 Ohio App. 196, 191 N.E. 706. The court there held that 
the statutory remedy was exclusive as to the surety com-
pany, but the case makes no reference as to any claim 
against the contractor. It is probable, as is the situation 
in most of such suits, that the contractor was either defunct 
or insolvent. Nowhere in the case is there reference to a 
claim by the materialman against the contractor on the 
basis of contract, as is the situation here, and that case 
does not hold that the remedy provided in the bonding 
statute is exclusive so as to prevent a claim against the 
contractor on contract. 
Defendants argue in their Brief that plaintiff "seeks to 
appropriate unto itself the benefits of the statute without 
being bound by the necessary and incidental statutory obli-
gations." This is not so. Plaintiff acknowledges that on its 
claim on the bond the requirements and obligations of the 
statute apply. However, plaintiff's claim on the contract 
is entirely apart from the statute and therefore the statutory 
requirements do not apply. 
We have heretofore, under Point I, discussed the case 
of Dix Lumber Company vs. Boston, Supra, pointing out 
that the ruling in that case is inapplicable to the circum-
stances of this case. 
In Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. vs. Southern 
Surety Co., 59 S.W. 2d 291, (Tex. Civ. App. 1933 ), cited 
on page 15 of Respondents' Brief, the Texas court held that 
even though the bond created common law obligations in-
dependent of the statutes, since the bond was given pur-
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suant to the requirements of the statute, the bond must be 
construed in connection therewith and the remedies afforded 
by the statute were exclusive. The court therefore held that 
any common law rights created by the bond were not en-
forceable. Plaintiff is not here pursuing common law bond 
obligations. It is rather pursuing common law contract 
obligations arising out of U. S. Steel's contract. 
Defendants' cited cases may have application to plain-
tiff's claim on the bond against the surety and the contrac-
tor but those cases do not apply to plaintiff's claim against 
the contractor on the contract. 
The issue presented in this case seldom arises because 
in most situations, the contractor and the subcontractor are 
not involved in the suit, they being insolvent. 
Plaintiff submits that State vs. Campbell Building Co., 
94 Utah 326, 77 P. 2d 341, cited in both plaintiff's and 
defendants' briefs, contains a clear statement of the law 
supporting plaintiff's position; that aside from rights on the 
bond the materialman has a separate claim against the 
contractor not restricted by the statute. The case is dis-
cussed on page 10 of plaintiff's brief and on page 18 of de-
fendants' brief. Defendants misconstrue the meaning of 
the statement from the case quoted and italicized in their 
brief at the bottom of page 18, particularly the following: 
"It is only when it is sought to hold the surety -
only when recovery is to be made under the hon~ 
- that the provisions of the statute come into play. 
A proper interpretation of this statement means simply that 
the provisions of the statute come into play when a claim 
is made on the bond. It certainly does not mean that the 
provisions of the statute come into play so as to restrict or 
preclude a separate claim made on the contract. 
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Respondents contend that appellant is not a creditor 
of the contractor, U. S. Steel. It is submitted that ap-
pellant is a creditor of said contractor. It is a creditor by 
virtue of the terms of U. S. Steel's contract with the State 
of U ah. By the terms thereof, plaintiff became a third party 
beneficiary on the basis of established principles of contract 
law. The rule is well stated in Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 4, 
Section 779 L pages 60, 61, quoted on pages 9 and 10 of 
plaintiff's (appellant's) brief. (See also Nash Engineering 
Co. v. Marcy Realty Corporation, supra.) 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
and judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff against U. S. 
Steel on the basis of plaintiff's contractual rights under 
the construction contract bond. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WAYNE C. DURHAM and 
GARY L. THEURER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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